Britain's often uneasy relationship with the European Union has become increasingly strained leading to speculation that Britain is -sooner or later -headed towards an in-out referendum that will result in its withdrawal. Such a development would present both Britain and the EU with unprecedented challenges. Britain's debate about its future in the EU -its 'European question' -creates a 'British question' for the EU, the answers to which could change the EU's unity, leadership, prosperity and security with implications for wider 
Introduction
Britain has rarely played a smooth part in European integration, earning the description of 'an awkward partner '. 2 Some in the rest of the European Union could be forgiven for thinking that in recent years Britain has gone further, becoming a dysfunctional and destructive partner. Not a day seems to pass without Britain's domestic politics causing problems for the rest of the EU. The relationship now seems characterised by vetoes, rows, allegations of blackmail, of Britain gambling with its future, and where even a British Foreign Secretary can declare that Britain is 'lighting a fire' under the EU. 3 Some of these problems stem from tensions within the Conservative Party. Yet the 'European question' in British politics is not simply about the problems of one political party. Whatever the outcome of the UK's 2015 general election, the issue of Britain's EU membership looks set to remain a topic of oftenfraught political debate. 4 All three of the UK's main parties are committed to holding an in-out referendum, albeit under different circumstances with Labour and the Liberal Democrats prepared to hold an in-out referendum in the event of any new EU treaty or significant transfer of new powers. 5 That the Eurosceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP) has emerged as a political force in part explains why this has happened. But we should not overlook the internal -and in the case of Scotland's vote on independence, existential -problems the UK is passing through which have knock-on effects for the rest of Europe. 6 While a British exit (also known as a 'Brexit') is not inevitable or as likely as might appear if one focuses on the UK's press coverage of EU matters, the UK's ongoing difficult relations with the rest of the EU mean it looks set to remain an awkward partner. Even if the government elected in 2015
is not directly committed to holding a referendum, the idea and possibility will continue to hang over UK-EU relations.
So far Britain's behaviour has provoked only a few direct calls for it to leave the EU. 7 This is in part because politicians of other member states have tried to avoid involving themselves in a topic that could influence the UK's 2015 general election. However, it is also because the idea of any member state either quitting or being forced out of the EU is a taboo. Either would be an unprecedented and potentially traumatic development. Despite this there is limited analysis of the potential implications for the EU of a withdrawal by Britain or any other member state. This compares with the plethora of books, reports, articles and speeches on what a Brexit could mean for the UK. 8 The growing possibility of a British exit, and the possibility of a Greek exit from the Eurozone (known as a 'Grexit'), has led to some publications, but these remain small in number. 9 The academic, especially theoretical literature is little better. The vast literature on Europeanisation includes only a few pieces that explore ideas and theories of European disintegration. 10 The field remains dominated by top-down theories of Europeanisation that assume continued integration. Much less 7 Michel Rocard, "A French message to Britain: get out of Europe before you wreck it," The Guardian, (6 June 2014), available: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/06/french-message-britain-get-outeuropean-union> (accessed 11 November 2014) 8 One aim of the article therefore is to provide a synthesis of the literature that allows us to map out some of the potential scenarios for how UK-EU relations may develop.
Ideas of European Disintegration
There have been few academic attempts to analyse the way in which the EU could reverse direction, either disintegrating or fragmenting. In one of the few pieces of work on this topic, century. Britain will also not operate alone. If there is something 'special' about the UK-US relationship then it is cooperation on intelligence, nuclear weapons and special forces.
Despite significant strains in the relationship, cooperation in these areas remains very close.
These capabilities and relationships also mean the UK has, or at least feels it has compared to many other EU member states, more options available to it when examining its future relations with the EU and the rest of the world.
Of course, all of this could change. Germany's population decline could be halted and reversed, its reputation for economic competitiveness and efficiency maintained. Britain's own economic power could falter thanks to an over-reliance on financial services and an Alternatively, the EU could continue to muddle through, with Britain's absence having little to no effect. The UK's absence from the Eurozone has not meant leadership or unity of it has been easy with deep disagreements over austerity policies and the degree of supranational oversight of member states. Any muddling through following a UK exit would also be the likely result of the remaining EU coming to terms with shifts and changes to the distribution of power within it. Germany's dominant position could be extended, reinforcing at an EU level Germany's preference for geoeconomic thinking over the geopolitical. 49 The EU's centre of gravity could also shift eastwards, presenting difficulties to states such as France that worry about an EU that no longer focuses on Western Europe and in particular the Franco-German axis.
The possibility of EU disintegration as a result of the Eurozone's problems remains a possibility. Whether a British exit by itself could trigger such a collapse would depend on whatever centrifugal pressures it could unleash. If a Brexit pressured Germany to weaken its commitment to either the EU or Eurozone, then as argued earlier by Webber, European integration could face its biggest test to date. 50 Britain might not even need to go so far as to withdraw to pose such a challenge. Demands by some in the UK for a renegotiated relationship within the EU have led to warnings from elsewhere in the EU that an 'a la carte Europe' is unacceptable as it would lead other states -and in particular political groups on the far right and left -to make their own demands, in turn fragmenting the EU.
The British question also has implications for wider European unity and cooperation. The
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and/or the European Economic Area (EEA) could be transformed by changes to UK-EU relations. Further afield, losing a large, western, Christian country would make it highly unlikely that some of the remaining states, especially France, will agree to a large eastern European, Muslim country such as Turkey being allowed to join.
But as with Norway and Switzerland, a British exit, or renegotiated relationship within the EU, could open up new models for relations that could then be extended to other states.
However, this depends on the willingness of these states to give up their own individual relationships with the EU, and the willingness of Britain or the EU to share any special arrangements.
If there is one issue that fuels the UK's debate about membership of the EU, it is economics.
The same applies to the EU, and especially countries such as Germany who have close relations with the UK in trade and shared approaches to political economy. Given the important part of economic interdependence to many theories of European integration, it is in this area that we may find some pointers to how the EU and the UK-EU relationship may develop should the UK decide to withdraw. The UK's economic place in the EU is substantial. Britain constitutes 14.8% of the EU's economic area, with 12.5% of its population. 51 British exports are 19.4% of the EU's total exports (excluding intra-EU trade).
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Within the EU Britain runs a trade deficit with the rest in goods and services of around £28 Nor is it clear whether the EU would allow the UK anything less than a backseat in TTIP. For the EU the partnership would be a bilateral one between Washington and Brussels.
Europe and Britain's Global Security Questions
Even if Britain -in or outside the EU -is a rising power in Europe, the place of Britain, the EU and wider Europe will continue to face decline in a wider global sense. should the EU remain weak or carry on muddling through, could make more likely a scenario, as outlined by Jan Techau, of a Europe that, "is not a pillar of world affairs but a territory that risks being pulled asunder between the United States and Asia".
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Conclusion
The EU faces a long list of challenges, not least of which are the Eurozone's continuing fragility and security fears surrounding the intentions of Russia towards Eastern Europe. The 'British Question' can therefore appear an unwanted distraction. If Britain is going to be halfhearted and awkward in its relationship with the EU then why should the rest of the EU show anything other than half-hearted interest in Britain? Similar feelings can be found amongst those in the UK who feel Britain would be better off if it withdrew from the predominant political and economic organisation of the continent it is forever bound to. Neither is a sustainable approach or likely to make the most of a relationship in which the EU will remain the most important relationship for the UK and an integral part of many of the domestic debates shaping Britain.
The various theories of European integration show that the UK's behavior -especially a Brexit -could be an important independent variable that shapes how the EU develops, in particular whether the EU disintegrates. A realist account points to the strained security situation in Europe, and Britain's unwillingness or inability to change this, as a key pressure on European integration. Cooperation between large member states, the key component of classic intergovernmentalism, could continue despite a Brexit if the Franco-German axis was sustained. The continued vitality of the Franco-German axis is also important for theories of international relations institutionalism; the durability of the EU's institutions being sustained by support from the axis. It would take a collapse of the Franco-German axis, perhaps brought on or exacerbated by a Brexit, to bring about the type of crisis necessary to change integration as understood by the theory of historic institutionalism. Theories of neofunctionalism, transactionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism provide perhaps the most optimistic outlook, with economic interdependence making it too costly even for a state such as the UK to withdraw or, should it do so, leaving it in a position where it will continue to be bound economically to the rest of the EU. For comparative federalism, Britain's increasingly distant political relationship with the EU could limit the potential for it to disrupt the emergence of a federal state. As Webber pointed out, with all of these theories we should not overlook the wider domestic politics of other EU member states, especially growing Euroscepticism in a range of states that mean the UK is not the only state with a strained political relationship with the rest of the EU. And the role of Germany is key, whether as part of a Franco-German axis or in its approach to managing the security and defence challenges the EU and European integration look set to face. Ignoring the possibility of a Brexit risks ignoring a development that would play an important, perhaps transformative, part in the EU's development.
A way has therefore to be found for the EU to give appropriate attention to the possibility of a Brexit. Focusing solely on the 'British question' would more than likely lead to disappointment on all sides. The attention would create expectations on the part of the British that concerns about Britain's membership are the most important issue on the agenda. This is an expectation the rest of the EU would be unable to fulfil. For the rest of the EU, focusing on Britain is likely to cause resentment across the EU at giving into -or being more willing to discuss -British demands at the expense of other agendas. Neither would be in the interests of the EU or wider European unity, especially when Europe's place in the world will face a growing number of challenges as the world enters a more multipolar era.
